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Corruption Cleanups in Africa

Lessons from Public Choice Theory

Weber State University, USA, jmbaku{at}weber.edu

The study critiques the development literature's neglect of the role played by institutions in development, with special emphasis on corruption cleanups. Such neglect is especially problematic in view of the fact that corruption is a major constraint to wealth creation and economic growth in Africa. The policy limitations of traditional development models with respect to corruption can be remedied by incorporating insights from the theory of public choice into the design and execution of new anti-corruption programs. Such insights include the introduction of new and more relevant rules, reform of existing laws and institutions, provision of more effective and relevant incentive structures, and enforcement mechanisms to reduce the profitability of opportunism.

Key Words: Africa • corruption • corruption cleanups • institutional reforms • public choice theory

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